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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Case No. 960214-CA 
V. 
GLENN EARL LLOYD, II, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an interlocutory appeal brought by the State 
challenging the magistrate's dismissal (after preliminary 
hearing) of one count of pattern of unlawful activity, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-10-1603 and 1603.5, and ten counts of money 
laundering, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903. This Court obtains 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) and Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the magistrate properly dismiss the count alleging 
pattern of unlawful activity when, after the preliminary hearing, 
he concluded that the state had failed to demonstrate the 
existence of an "enterprise"? This issue presents a question of 
law which this Court reviews de novo without deference. State v. 
Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
2. Did the magistrate properly dismiss the money 
laundering counts when, after the preliminary hearing, he 
concluded that the state had failed to demonstrate that Lloyd 
attempted to conceal or disguise the alleged proceeds of criminal 
activity? This issue also presents a question of law which this 
Court reviews de novo without deference. Id. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules 
are contained in Addendum B of Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Lloyd was charged by information with 14 counts of 
securities fraud, 10 counts of offering unregistered securities, 
one count of pattern of unlawful activity (racketeering), and 10 
counts of money laundering. In the Fall of 19 95, the lower court 
held a four day preliminary hearing and thereafter bound Lloyd 
over on the securities violation counts, but dismissed the 
racketeering and money laundering counts. With respect to the 
racketeering count, the magistrate found that the prosecution 
failed to establish the existence of an "enterprise" which is one 
of the elements of that offense. The money laundering counts 
were dismissed because the magistrate concluded the prosecution 
failed to establish that Lloyd made financial transactions with 
the intent to conceal of disguise the proceeds obtained from the 
alleged victims. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Sometime in the early 1990s, defendant Lloyd set up an 
investment advisor business called Applied Financial Concepts. 
(R. at 1062) A number of the investor/victims in this case were 
established clients who had in the past successfully invested 
their money through Lloyd in various investments presented by 
Lloyd. (See, e.g., R. at 1087-89) 
2. Subsequent to an investigation by the State of Utah, on 
or about December 6, 1994, Lloyd was charged in a 34-count 
information alleging 24 counts of securities violations, 1 count 
of pattern of unlawful activity (racketeering), and 10 counts of 
money laundering. (R. 3-22) 
3. On or about July 20, 1995, the state filed an amended 
information which included an allegation added to count 25 
(racketeering) that certain assets held by Lloyd (including 
personal property such as a piano, a car, and a boat) were 
forfeitable under Utah's racketeering statute. (R. at 200-01, 
208) 
4. In the Affidavit of Probable Cause, Verdi White, a 
sergeant with the Utah Department of Public Safety, explained the 
nature and scope of his investigation of Lloyd. Between January 
1, 1990, and November 1, 1994, Lloyd allegedly sold investments 
in the following companies: Sourceline Capital; F.C. Finance; 
F.C. Leasing; A F C ; Peak Strategy Management; Cross Country 
Management; A F C Inter-cap; Tempus Utile; CC Management; 
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Internal Capitalization Partnership; Star King, Inc.; Adalyn 
Financial Services; and M.M.G. Inc. (R. at 29) 
5. Lloyd allegedly offered these investments to potential 
investors, and in so doing made material misrepresentations or 
omitted material facts about the companies. It was further 
alleged that the securities Lloyd offered for sale were 
unregistered. (R. at 30-32) 
6. When an investor purchased an interest in one of the 
investments identified in paragraph 4, the investor would write a 
check payable to that particular company, and the check would 
then be deposited into an account bearing the name of that 
company. Lloyd had signatory control over all but one of the 
investment accounts. (R. at 34; 1109-1186; 1223-1235; 1157) 
7. In addition to the above-referenced allegations, the 
state claimed that the deposits made by Lloyd into the various 
accounts, as well as transactions between accounts, constituted 
money laundering violations under Utah law. Accordingly, Lloyd 
allegedly "diverted these funds to other accounts or invested 
said funds into other enterprises, all for the purpose of 
continuing the unlawful activity of securities fraud." (R. at 
34-35) 
8. Based on the allegations of securities violations and 
money laundering (the predicate acts), the state charged Lloyd 
with engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1903 (racketeering). The state's theory was 
4 
expressed as follows: "By collecting investments in the listed 
companies, Lloyd was able to acquire, establish, and maintain 
control over those enterprises. Lloyd owned and operated [the] 
enterprises [described in paragraph 4]." (R. at 32-33) 
9. However, Verdi White stated in his affidavit that 
11
 [m] ost of these enterprises were no more than bank accounts 
through which Lloyd ran investor funds." (R. at 33) 
10. At the preliminary hearing, White testified that he 
discovered registered names for some but not all of the 
businesses. In particular, Sourceline Capital (R. at 1125), F.C. 
Finance (R. at 1138), F.C. Leasing (R. at 1144), and Tempus Utile 
(R. at 1165) were registered business names. However, White 
found no evidence that A F C (R. at 1335-39), Peak Strategy 
Management (R. at 1153), Cross Country Management (R. at 1168), 
A F C Inter-cap (R. at 1161), C.C. Management (R. at 1168), or 
Internal Capitalization Partnership (R. at 1170) were registered 
business names. 
11. Significantly, White also testified that during his 
investigation he found no evidence of ongoing business in the 
various "enterprises" which he had referenced in his affidavit: 
Sourceline Capital (R. at 1124-25, 1133); F.C. Finance (R. at 
1138, 1143); F.C. Leasing (R. at 1144); A.F.C. (R. at 1149); Peak 
Strategy Management (R. at 1153); A F C Inter-cap (R. at 1161); 
C.C. Management (R. at 1168); Internal Capitalization Partnership 
(R. at 1170); Cross Country Management (R. at 1168). Further, 
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the state offered no evidence that Tempus Utile was a company 
with ongoing business activities. 
12. The Cross Country Management account was the only 
account which Lloyd did not solely own and control. Although the 
account signatories were two other individuals, Lloyd is the 
person who opened the account by depositing a check from one of 
his clients. (R. at 1157; 1533-40) 
13. The state offered no evidence that Lloyd had employees 
at Applied Financial Concepts. Moreover, although there were 
others who were signatories on bank accounts, the state did not 
explain the relationship of those individuals to either Lloyd or 
to Applied Financial Concepts. 
14. At the end of the preliminary hearing, the magistrate 
made the following Conclusions of Law: (1) probable cause 
existed to bind over counts 1 through 24, (2) probable cause 
existed to establish evidence of the pattern element required 
under the racketeering statute, (3) there was no probable cause 
to suggest that Lloyd's investment advisor business, as well as 
his use of various dbas in establishing checking accounts, 
demonstrated the existence of an enterprise, (4) the evidence 
used to establish the investment advisor company, as well as 
evidence of the dbas, is evidence that further establishes and 
proves the pattern element, but does not prove the enterprise, 
and (4) there was no probable cause to bind over the money 
laundering counts since there was insufficient evidence to 
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establish that Lloyd intentionally concealed the proceeds 
obtained from the unlawful activity. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Pattern of Unlawful Activity (Racketeering). Under 
Utah's racketeering statute, which is modeled after the federal 
statute commonly known as RICO, the state must prove the 
existence of an "enterprise." The magistrate properly dismissed 
the racketeering count because the state failed to establish the 
enterprise element of the statute. During the relevant period of 
time, Lloyd worked as an investment advisor. The evidence at the 
preliminary hearing established that he was a "one-man show" 
without associates or employees. Accordingly, the state did not 
prove that an enterprise existed which had a separate and 
distinct identity from Lloyd himself. The state merely relied on 
the pattern of unlawful activity to prove the enterprise. 
2. Money Laundering. By depositing the money in various 
bank accounts, Lloyd did not attempt to conceal or disguise his 
control over proceeds which he obtained from the alleged victims 
in this case. This analysis requires the proper focus. Lloyd's 
alleged misrepresentations to the victims are irrelevant. The 
state cannot bootstrap its money laundering theory to the 
evidence supporting counts alleging securities violations. In 
this case the circumstances surrounding the actual deposits (the 
financial transactions) did not show an intent to conceal or 
disguise. Lloyd was the signatory on all but one of the 
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accounts, and his signature was required on the back of each 
check for deposit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Magistrate Properly Dismissed the Racketeering 
Count Since the State Failed to Demonstrate the 
Existence of an "Enterprise". 
Count 25 of the Amended Information (R. at 200-01) charges 
Lloyd under the Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1601 et seq. The prohibited acts are set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 [hereinafter "racketeering statute"]. 
Section 1603 is divided into four sections, and Lloyd was charged 
under the first three. The statute, with the elements of each 
section bracketed, reads as follows: 
(1) It is unlawful for [1] any person who has 
received any proceeds derived, whether directly or 
indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in 
which the person has participated as a principal, [2] 
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of 
that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the 
proceeds derived from the investment or use of those 
proceeds, [3] in the acquisition of any interest in, or 
the establishment or operation of, any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for [1] any person through a 
pattern of unlawful activity [2] to acquire or 
maintain, directly or indirectly, [3] any interest in 
or control of any enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for [1] any person employed by or 
associated with any enterprise [2] to conduct or 
participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of that enterprise's affairs [3] through a 
pattern of unlawful activity. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to 
violate any provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (3). 
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The statute is modeled after Title 18 U.S.C. 1962 
(Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations or RICO), and 
the structure of the two statutes is identical. The federal 
statute, however, includes language which identifies the 
constitutional requirement of an interstate commerce nexus. 
Sections (1), (2), and (3) of the state statute have their 
counterparts in sections (a), (b), and (c) of the federal 
statute, respectively. 
The State advances two alternative theories to support its 
argument that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate the 
enterprise element under section 1603. First, Lloyd operated an 
investment advisor business, Applied Financial Concepts, and the 
pattern of unlawful activity was carried out during the course of 
advising his clients about various investment opportunities. 
Under this theory, Lloyd's investment advisor company is the 
enterprise. Second, Lloyd was involved in an association-in-fact 
enterprise consisting of himself and the registered and 
unregistered businesses he represented. (Plaintiff's Brief at 
27) . 
A. Introduction and Background. 
State and federal racketeering statutes are powerful and 
popular weapons in the prosecutor's arsenal. The original target 
of the federal statute was organized crime, such as the Mafia, 
since traditional criminal statutes were having little impact in 
that context. The scope of racketeering prosecutions, however, 
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has expanded considerably, and includes white collar business 
fraud. One commentator has attempted to explain the popularity, 
as well as the inherent dangers, of the federal racketeering 
statute: 
The dramatic increase in the use of RICO in criminal 
and civil prosecutions beginning in the early 1980s can 
be explained, in part, by the lure of financial rewards 
[forfeiture of assets] that RICO offers. The 
predominant reason for the increased use of RICO, 
however, lies in the elasticity of RICO's limiting 
principles of "predicate" acts, a "pattern" of 
racketeering conduct, and an involved "enterprise." 
While these terms were meant to distinguish between the 
common criminal and organized criminal, they were not 
equal to the task. Accordingly, RICO's perceived and 
actual overbreadth can be traced directly to the 
failure of these statutory terms to place meaningful 
limits on RICO's reach in either criminal or civil 
prosecutions. 
Terrence G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 Vand. L. 
Rev. 691, 693 (1990). 
This can also be said for the Utah statute, which relies on 
the same dangerously flexible principles, principles which do not 
have any self-evident meaning and which can be molded and shaped 
to fit the most common kinds of criminal activity and the most 
conventional kinds of criminals. One critic of the generic and 
indiscriminate use of federal civil racketeering statutes has 
observed the following: 
My RICO perspective comes from my years as a federal 
district court judge in Chicago from 1980 to 1987, when 
I witnessed the real birth and growth of civil RICO. I 
am told . . . that for a time I had written more RICO 
opinions than any other judge in the country. . . . As 
I dealt with these cases it became clear to me that 
most civil RICO cases simply should not be in federal 
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court. The majority of civil RICO cases involve 
commonplace commercial controversies . . . . [which 
are] recharacterized by resourceful attorneys to 
conform with the requirements of RICO: adding a few 
allegations of the use of the mails or wires in 
furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, describing how the 
mail or wire fraud offenses form a pattern, and 
explaining how the defendants conducted the affairs of 
an appropriate enterprise. Thus transmogrified, the 
ordinary state law fraud or contract action becomes a 
federal "racketeering" case. . . . 
Susan Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" 
Civil RICO Cases Does Not Work: It's Time for Concrress to Act, 43 
Vand. L. Rev. 673, 674 (1990). 
Although the focus of this criticism is civil RICO, the same 
reasoning applies to the use of racketeering statutes in ordinary 
criminal fraud cases. Of course the Utah Legislature has acted, 
and has included securities fraud as a predicate offense under 
section 1603. The foregoing critique, however, does demonstrate 
why it is appropriate and necessary to clearly define statutory 
concepts such as "enterprise" and "pattern of unlawful activity." 
Given the significant due process concerns when a person's 
liberty is at stake, the need for clarity in criminal cases is 
even more important than in civil cases. These definitional 
problems, as well as policy concerns and the danger of selective 
prosecution, are most notable in the context of white collar 
crime z1 
1
 Indeed, as one lawyer for the Department of Justice has 
noted, the government must exercise restraint in its use of RICO 
to prosecute white-collar crime. Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., 
Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice, 43 Vand. L. 
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Cases in which the defendants were regarded by 
prosecutors as professional white collar offenders . . 
. would presumably be regarded by prosecutors as worthy 
of the enhanced sanctions of RICO. 
Notably, almost none of these [white collar] cases 
involves even a hint of organized criminal activity. 
Moreover, it is very difficult to distinguish these 
federal cases from the typical run of fraud cases that 
are prosecuted daily in the federal courts without the 
assistance of RICO. . . . The only apparent motivating 
factor for the use of RICO in these cases would appear 
to be prosecutorial interest in either the aggravated 
sentencing possible under RICO or the specific 
forfeiture remedy--or, along the same lines, the 
greater rhetorical impact achieved by convicting a 
white collar defendant of a more serious sounding 
crime. 
Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87 Columbia 
L. Rev. 661, 751 (1987) (criticizing the controversial and 
widespread use of RICO in ordinary business fraud cases). In the 
last fifteen years or so, courts have attempted to properly the 
limit the scope and reach of federal RICO. This Brief advocates 
the application of those limiting principles to Utah's 
racketeering statute, a law which has not been the subject of 
thorough judicial scrutiny since its enactment.2 
Rev. 651, 671 (1990). 
2
 There are few cases interpreting Utah's racketeering 
statute. As a result, this Brief relies extensively on federal 
law since the majority of racketeering cases (both civil and 
criminal) are filed in federal court. 
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B. Under Section 1603, the Enterprise Must Be 
Distinct and Separate from the Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity. 
As an essential element of a racketeering offense under 
Utah's racketeering statute, the state must prove that the 
pattern of unlawful activity is connected to an "enterprise." 
However, the state failed to meet its burden on this element. 
Lloyd did not associate with nor did he acquire, operate, or 
maintain an "enterprise" as that term is defined in the case law. 
In United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982), 
one of the leading cases discussing the enterprise element of the 
parallel federal statute, the Eighth Circuit formulated the 
following three-part test for a RICO enterprise: (1) there must 
be a common or shared purpose among those associated with the 
enterprise, (2) the enterprise must "function as a continuing 
unit," and (3) the enterprise must have "an ascertainable 
structure distinct from that interest in the conduct of a pattern 
of racketeering activity." 674 F.2d at 665 (8th Cir. 1982). 
In Bledsoe, the court concluded that the government did not 
prove an enterprise, and reversed the defendant's RICO 
conviction. The government had argued that a group of 
agricultural cooperatives was an enterprise whose purpose was to 
engage in a securities fraud scheme. The court explained the 
structure requirement as follows: 
This distinct structure might be demonstrated by proof 
that a group engaged in a diverse pattern of crimes or 
that it has an organizational pattern or system of 
13 
authority beyond what was necessary to perpetrate the 
predicate crimes. The command system of a Mafia family 
is an example of this type of structure as is the 
hierarchy, planning, and division of profits within a 
prostitution ring. 
674 F.2d at 665. 
Logically, there must be some degree of organization 
necessary to commit the predicate acts in the first place. 
Merely showing the commission of predicate offenses, however, 
does not prove an enterprise. Accordingly, this led the Bledsoe 
court to conclude that "an enterprise cannot simply be the 
undertaking of the acts of racketeering11 nor can it be the 
minimal association which surrounds the illegal conduct. Id. at 
664. This makes a great deal of sense because n[a]ny two 
criminal acts will necessarily be surrounded by some degree of 
organization and no two individuals will ever jointly perpetrate 
a crime without some degree of association apart from the 
commission of the crime itself." Id. 
The Eighth Circuit has further observed that several 
criminal acts committed by a common set of perpetrators "will 
necessarily be surrounded by some degree of organization," but in 
order to constitute an offense under RICO, the prosecution must 
show "proof of some structure separate from the racketeering 
activity and distinct from the organization which is a necessary 
incident to the racketeering."3 Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 
3
 In the context of a federal narcotics offense, a 
defendant who supervises five or more people can be charged with 
14 
1060 (8th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, to show an "enterprise," the 
prosecutor must offer different evidence than that evidence which 
was offered to prove a "pattern of racketeering." 
Another Eighth Circuit case, decided after Bledsoe, 
illustrates the necessary distinction between the enterprise and 
the pattern of racketeering activity. In United States v. 
Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1988), the defendants challenged 
their RICO convictions arguing that the government did not 
provide sufficient evidence of an enterprise. The defendants 
were attempting to illegally infiltrate two labor unions in the 
St. Louis area by murdering opponents. The court found that 
there was sufficient evidence to show an ascertainable structure 
distinct from the pattern requirement. The court noted that the 
structure was found in the family and social relationships 
between the members of the group and their concerted attempts to 
gain control of the local unions, which could be viewed in 
complete isolation from the group's pattern of racketeering 
activity. The court further observed that this was precisely the 
kind of command system discussed in Bledsoe. Id. at 1363-64. 
See also United States v. Flvnn, 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1988) (a 
operating a "continuing criminal enterprise." 21 U.S.C. § 
848(c)(2)(A). The "enterprise" is proved simply by the number of 
people involved in the criminal activity. This way federal 
prosecutors have a much easier time of proving the existence of 
an enterprise, since all that is required is the ability to 
count. "Enterprise" under this statute means and association of 
people. 
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case related to Leisure and relying on many of the same facts and 
relationships to demonstrate the enterprise element). 
The Seventh Circuit also requires a distinction between 
pattern and enterprise. In United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 
1362 (7th Cir. 1991), the court reasoned that " [i]f the 
'enterprise' is just a name for the crimes the defendants 
committed . . . then it would not be an 'enterprise' within the 
meaning of the statute. . . . Otherwise, two statutory elements--
enterprise and pattern--would be collapsed into one." 924 F.2d 
1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). In Masters, the 
government advanced the theory that a lawyer and his law firm 
together with two police officers and their respective police 
departments (three people, three organizations) constituted an 
enterprise under RICO. The lawyer, Masters, had a kickback 
scheme with the officers, Keating and Corbitt, whereby the 
officers referred arrested persons to Masters for legal 
assistance. Masters had similar schemes with other officers in 
the area. 
Masters then discovered that his wife was having an affair, 
and enlisted the help of Keating and Corbitt to kill her. The 
murder was carried out, and Masters collected on the $100,000 
insurance policy. On appeal, the court found there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find an "enterprise 
consisting of the three defendants and the three organizations 
that they controlled or manipulated" and that this operated as an 
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"organization with a structure and goals separate from the 
predicate acts . . . " Id. at 1367. As in Leisure and Flynn, the 
court emphasized that the enterprise was characterized by the 
informal relationships among the defendants that permitted them 
to respond quickly and effectively as a cohesive group in order 
to further their goals. Id. 
Finally, the separateness of pattern and enterprise is again 
demonstrated by the facts in United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 
524 (2d Cir. 1988). Salerno is the quintessential case applying 
the federal RICO statute to the complex criminal schemes of 
organized crime. The Salerno court began by describing the 
nature of the enterprise: 
The RICO enterprise alleged in the indictment is an 
organization known as the "Commission" of La Cosa 
Nostra, a nationwide criminal society which operates 
through local organizations know as "families." The 
indictment alleged, and substantial evidence at trial 
established, that the Commission has for some time 
acted as the ultimate ruling body over the five La Cosa 
Nostra families in New York City and affiliated 
families in other cities. The general purpose of the 
Commission is to regulate and facilitate the 
relationships between and among the several La Cosa 
Nostra families, and more specifically to promote and 
coordinate joint ventures of a criminal nature 
involving the families, to resolve disputes among the 
families, to extend formal recognition to "bosses" of 
the families and on occasion resolve leadership 
disputes within a family, to approve the initiation or 
"making" of new members of the families, and to 
establish rules governing the families, officers and 
members of La Cosa Nostra. 
868 F.2d at 
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The attributes of the organization or enterprise, however, 
were distinct from the various criminal schemes which established 
a pattern of criminal activity (the predicate acts). The first 
scheme was a labor bribery operation known as "the Club." The 
Club was an arrangement between the Commission and several New 
York concrete construction companies whereby the Commission 
threatened labor problems if companies did not provide kick-backs 
to the Commission. The second scheme was a loansharking 
conspiracy, and the third was a scheme to commit murder in order 
to end a dispute in the Bonanno crime family. Id. 
C. The Actor Cannot be Both the Person and the 
Enterprise that Conducts its Affairs through 
a Pattern of Racketeering Activity. 
There is another limiting principle in RICO jurisprudence 
that further restricts the definition or scope of an enterprise. 
Not only must the enterprise be distinct from the pattern, but 
the actor cannot be both the "person" and the "enterprise" that 
conducts its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 
United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1985). 
In DiCaro, the government's enterprise theory under section (c) 
was that defendant had conducted his own affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering activity. The predicate offenses were 
four actual or attempted armed robberies, two thefts, and an 
attempted murder. On appeal, the court reversed the RICO 
conviction, reasoning that "if we construed section 1962(c) to 
permit the same entity to be both the person and the enterprise, 
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we would reach the anomalous result that the entity was employed 
by or associated with itself." Id. at 1319. The court noted 
that in a prior civil RICO case, McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 
142 (7th Cir. 1985), a defendant-proprietor of a sole 
proprietorship could be held liable under section (c). DiCaro, 
772 F.2d at 1320. The distinguishing fact in McCullough, 
however, was that the defendant had several employees working for 
him; accordingly "'this made his company an enterprise, and not 
just a one-man band.'" Id. (quoting McCullough, 757 F.2d at 
144). "'[I]f the sole proprietorship were strictly a one-man 
show,'" liability for the defendant would be precluded under 
section (c). Id. "If Suter had no employees or other associates 
and simply did business under the name of the National Investment 
Publishing Company, it could hardly be said that he was 
associating with an enterprise called the National Investment 
Publishing Company; you cannot associate with yourself, any more 
than you can conspire with yourself just by giving yourself a nom 
de guerre." McCullough, 757 F.2d at 144. 
A federal district court in Illinois reached the same 
conclusion in a case with a white-collar defendant, a lawyer who 
was a sole practitioner. In United States v. Yonan, 622 F.Supp. 
721 (N.D. 111. 1985), the government proceeded on a section (c) 
theory alleging eight predicate offenses of mail fraud. The 
court dismissed the section (c) count, and cited DiCaro for the 
proposition that the entity or person cannot be employed by or 
19 
associated with itself. Id. at 723-24. 
The principle in DiCaro and Yonan was applied in United 
States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1986), but with a 
different, although logical, result. While adopting the analysis 
of the Seventh Circuit, Id. at 1416, the court in Benny 
nevertheless affirmed the conviction, observing that the 
defendant had not associated with himself: "The indictment thus 
separated defendant Benny, an individual, from the enterprise, an 
association of four individuals [three of whom were co-
defendants] allegedly operating under the name of one of them." 
Id. at 1415. 
This principle also undermines the state's argument that 
Lloyd was part of an association-in-fact with the businesses he 
purported to represent. (State's Brief at 35) This raises 
conflicting theories, because at the same time the state offered 
uncontroverted evidence that those businesses did not even exist. 
Accordingly, the state advances the argument that Lloyd was part 
of an association-in-fact enterprise with businesses which had no 
factual existence. 
In United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 656-57 (9th Cir. 
1988) , the court found an association-in-fact enterprise made up 
of seven corporations and two individuals. The indictment in the 
case alleged that the enterprise "associated . . . for the 
purpose of defrauding insurance companies and others through 
repeated acts of arson." Id. at 657. The Feldman court 
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emphasized that "[a] number of the corporations in count 18 were 
far from 'one-man shows': [four of the corporations] had 
employees and operated as active businesses. . . . All the 
corporations enjoyed the legal status that incorporation 
provides. It was their very separate existence that made 
Feldman's activities possible and profitable . . . " Id. at 656. 
Accordingly, the group of corporations and individuals were 
separate and distinct from the defendant himself. Id. To 
analyze whether an enterprise exits various corporations and 
individuals, it is necessary to identify "objective 
interconnections" and this requires "a careful scrutiny of the 
facts." IcL_ at 657-58. 
One of the core facts of the Feldman decision is that the 
government apparently offered evidence that the corporations were 
actually conducting business, and that the individuals were 
actively involved in the operations of those corporations. In 
fact, the court pointed out that the companies were engaged in 
legal activities such as tool manufacturing, business 
acquisitions, building modular homes, and operating a car wash. 
Significantly, the court also noted that "[t]hose corporations 
created by Feldman that could be construed as existing only to 
defraud creditors . . . were not charged as part of the 
enterprise." Id. at 660. 
In the instant case, state investigator Verdi White 
testified at the preliminary hearing that he found no evidence of 
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any day-to-day operations in any of the companies which Lloyd had 
allegedly created to perpetrate the fraud. The State's theory is 
that the companies did not exist, and that Lloyd merely set up 
the bank accounts as part of the ruse. It defies logic to 
conclude that for enterprise purposes one may "associate" with 
businesses that do not exist. One might respond that this 
reasoning enables culpable individuals to escape liability by 
creating "shell" businesses. Such a conclusion, however, ignores 
the precise social and economic harms which racketeering statutes 
were designed to attack: organized and complex criminal schemes 
not easily crushed by traditional crime fighting tools. 
In discussing the objectives of federal RICO, the court in 
Bledsoe explained that "[1]egitimate businesses and other 
legitimate organizations tend to have a definite structure and 
clear boundaries which limit the applicability of a criminal 
statute aimed at the infiltration of criminal elements into these 
entities." 674 F.2d at 662. Accordingly, this infiltration of 
"legitimate entities also warrants [RICO's] severe sanctions," 
such as forfeiture of assets. Id. This identifies the problem 
of systemic corruption in a legitimate business or organization, 
where prosecution of one or several persons under traditional 
criminal statutes will not dismantle the entire business. 
However, the one-man show operates differently, and a traditional 
prosecution under the substantive law, such as mail or securities 
fraud, will achieve the desired result of stopping the corrupt 
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activities completely. Where the actor works alone, there is 
only one head to sever. Once that is accomplished, there is 
nothing left. Therefore, an investment advisor who works alone, 
and in the course of business commits several acts of securities 
fraud, poses substantially less harm than a brokerage house that 
does the same thing through its brokers, and the practice is 
embedded in the structure of the company. 
If racketeering statutes were not interpreted with the 
Bledsoe limiting construction, then an actor whom commits 
multiple criminal acts simultaneously creates an enterprise. 
Central to the issue in the case at bar is the fact that when 
viewing the state's case in a light most favorable to the state, 
there was no evidence of an organizational pattern or system of 
authority beyond what was necessary for one man, acting alone, to 
perpetrate the predicate crimes. 
According to the state, Lloyd completed the predicate 
offenses while working as an investment advisor, and that Lloyd's 
identity as an investment advisor coupled with allegations that 
he sold fraudulent investments is sufficient to demonstrate an 
enterprise. 
Likewise, a physician who defrauds Medicare has also created 
an enterprise, as has a criminal defense lawyer who submits 
fraudulent claims in federal court for work done by court 
appointment under the Criminal Justice Act. Although section 
1603 reaches the activities of the so-called "one man show," the 
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enterprise principle must be carefully defined to attack the more 
complicated, far-reaching, and sophisticated criminal schemes 
rather than "garden variety" fraud. This is true whether the 
scheme is accomplished by one person or by many. 
Lloyd was a "one-man show" working without associates. He 
cannot associate with himself or the business, Applied Financial 
Concepts, which is simply an alter ego or his nom de guerre. 
There are no facts in this case which suggest the organization or 
command structure necessary to demonstrate an enterprise under 
section 1603. The state argues that Lloyd "likely employed a 
secretary" and that there was evidence offered at the preliminary 
hearing "suggesting that defendant had at least one employee." 
State's Brief at 34-35. This kind of supposition is inadequate 
as a matter of law to show organization and command structure.4 
The evidence offered at the preliminary hearing demonstrated 
(for the narrow purpose of a probable cause determination) the 
commission of multiple similar offenses by an investment advisor 
while in his professional capacity. Viewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the state Lloyd, while wearing his 
investment advisor hat, violated state law (the predicate acts of 
4
 Organization and command structure are two of the central 
concepts used to determine the existence of an enterprise or 
association. The state warns that "defendant should not escape 
enterprise liability solely because he was sophisticated enough 
to avoid formal incorporation." State's Brief at 35. However, 
the absence of formal incorporation is not and never has been the 
way to avoid racketeering liability, and Lloyd has never argued 
the contrary position. 
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Counts 1 through 24 and 26 through 35). Thus the state's 
sweeping theory is that if an investment advisor, in the course 
of doing business, violates the securities laws, then the advisor 
has created an enterprise for carrying out a pattern of unlawful 
activity. It makes no difference if the advisor was also 
offering legitimate investment opportunities such as certificates 
of deposit, insurance policies, and annuities. Three separate 
acts of securities fraud by an investment advisor is a per se 
violation of the racketeering statute. 
Finally, the state argues, in support of its section (1) and 
(2) theories, that when Lloyd deposited funds into bank accounts 
that he controlled, including his business account, that this 
constituted the use of income from racketeering activity to 
operate the enterprise. State's Brief at 35. 
Under sections (1) and (2) of the racketeering statute, the 
state must still demonstrate the existence of an enterprise, and 
then further show that proceeds derived from prohibited 
activities were used to acquire, maintain, or operate the 
enterprise. The state appears to suggest that "enterprise" might 
have a different definition under sections (1) and (2) than it 
does under section (3). But the essential logical flaw remains: 
even if the actor is putting the proceeds back into the 
enterprise, the enterprise is himself. Again, according to the 
state's argument, the doctor or lawyer who puts a few thousand 
dollars of tainted funds into a business account can be 
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prosecuted under a racketeering theory, even if the actor did not 
associate with others for a common purpose. 
Whatever section of the statute supports the theory of a 
racketeering prosecution, it is essential to keep in mind the 
powerful forfeiture provisions available to the state. Although 
it is important to compensate victims for the harm done to them, 
that is not the objective of those provisions. The objective is 
to destroy the enterprise thereby protecting the public from 
future harm. The state obtains the same result with the 
successful prosecution of the one-man show. The culpable person 
is gone, and so is his business. Forfeiture simply becomes 
window dressing. 
Consider the circumstances of a prostitute who works alone. 
She meets the pattern element by committing multiple predicate 
offenses. In can be assumed that some of the money she makes she 
"invests" back into the business, perhaps by purchasing clothes, 
condoms, and other necessities of the trade. The state's 
proposed definition of "enterprise" would indeed apply to an 
ordinary prostitute who uses the money she earns to stay in 
business. 
The perpetual harm caused by an enterprise, irrespective of 
the status of the people involved in the enterprise, appears to 
be the rationale behind the rule that in a civil RICO claim 
alleging a violation under section 1962(a), a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that he suffered an "injury 'by reason o f 
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defendant ['s] investment of racketeering income in an 
enterprise." Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 
1990); accord Grider v. Texas Oil and Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 
1149 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 76 
(1989). Thus the harm identified under the first two sections of 
either the state or federal statute is connected to the ongoing 
activities of the corrupt enterprise. In the instant case, any 
injury was caused by the alleged securities violations, not by 
any alleged investment back into an enterprise. Further, the 
deposit of proceeds into a business account does not even come 
close to providing adequate evidence of investment in the 
enterprise, especially since the state contends that money was 
often transferred between accounts controlled by Lloyd. The 
state cannot argue with any specificity how proceeds were used to 
acquire, maintain, or operate the enterprise. 
In sum, the allegations of securities fraud and offering 
unregistered securities are factually inseparable from the so-
called enterprise. The magistrate properly dismissed count 25 of 
the information. 
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II. The Magistrate Properly Dismissed the Money Laundering 
Counts Because the State Failed to Show that Lloyd 
Intentionally Concealed or Disguised Proceeds from 
Unlawful Activity. 
The State's money laundering theory rests on the following 
language contained in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1990) :5 
(1) A person commits the offense of money laundering by 
financial transaction if, knowing that the property involved 
in a financial transaction represents proceeds of some form 
of unlawful activity, he conducts or attempts to conduct a 
financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity: 
(b) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole 
or in part to: 
(i) conceal or disguise the nature, the location, 
the source, the ownership, or the control of the 
proceeds of the specified unlawful activity. 
The crucial focus in this case is as follows: in making certain 
financial transaction, did Lloyd intend to conceal or disguise 
the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the 
allegedly tainted proceeds? For bind over purposes, the evidence 
at the preliminary hearing was inadequate to show an intent to 
conceal or disguise, and the magistrate properly dismissed the 
money laundering counts. 
Money laundering is not a crime against a citizen-victim, 
but is instead an offense against public health and safety. 
However, the State argues that the "conceal and disguise" element 
is satisfied because Lloyd misdirected the victims into believing 
5
 It is this statute which was in effect at the time that 
the alleged criminal violations took place. The statue was 
amended by the Utah Legislature in 1995. 
28 
that the money was under the control of the various companies or 
that Lloyd refused to answer questions regarding the whereabouts 
of the proceeds. The state also observes that the magistrate 
found that (1) interest payment were drawn on cashiers' checks 
(not company checks), (2) the proceeds were put into "shell" 
accounts, all but one of which were controlled by Lloyd, and (3) 
Lloyd personally withdrew monies "and/or made multiple transfers 
of the proceeds between his other controlled accounts and other 
entities." (State's Brief at 43-44) Accordingly, because of his 
alleged deception, Lloyd "effectively concealed the proceeds' 
nature, location, ownership and control." Id. 
The state's theory attempts to reach conduct that does not 
amount to money laundering under the Utah statute. The factual 
analysis advanced by the State, if accepted as true, demonstrates 
a continuous fraudulent scheme committed by an investment advisor 
against specific individual victims who had invested money 
through that advisor. 
Originally, money laundering statutes (as well as cash 
transaction reporting statutes) were enacted by legislatures to 
punish the concealment of assets derived from the narcotics 
trade. See John K. Villa, Banking Crimes: Fraud, Money 
Laundering, and Embezzlement § 8.01 (1987) (discussing public 
concern for drug trade interdiction and punishment as the 
catalyst for federal laundering statutes). Accordingly, in 
United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1247 (10th Cir. 1994), the 
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court observed that the federal "money laundering statute was 
designed to punish those drug dealers who thereafter take the 
additional step of attempting to legitimize their proceeds so 
that observers think their money is derived from legal 
enterprises." In other words, laundering statutes are intended 
to make it difficult for criminals to enjoy the fruits of their 
crimes. 
Accordingly, the "conceal or disguise" language is aimed at 
attributing criminal liability when a person attempts to hide the 
unlawful activity, by a financial transaction, from the 
authorities (law enforcement, the courts, the Internal Revenue 
Service, etc.). A person does not "launder" money to conceal it 
from the victims of fraud. 
Because money laundering statutes, like racketeering 
statutes, are new weapons available to state and federal 
prosecutors, courts have been asked to decide how broadly 
statutes should be interpreted. The Tenth Circuit, for example 
has rejected a broad reading of the federal money laundering 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956. In United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 
940 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 846 (1991), the defendant 
was convicted of narcotic, racketeering, and money laundering 
offenses. On appeal, defendant argued that at trial the 
prosecution presented insufficient evidence to establish that his 
purchase of two cars was for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising drug proceeds under section 1956. Section 1956 is 
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structured much like the Utah money laundering statute. As in 
the case at bar, in Sanders the relevant portion of the statute 
was the concealment or disguise prong set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(a)(1)(B)(i). IdL at 944-45. 
The Sanders court observed that the defendant and his wife 
had both been present when the cars were purchased and they had 
used the cars conspicuously, two facts which undermined the 
element of concealment. Further, although one of the cars was 
titled in the defendant's daughter's name, there was sufficient 
connection to the defendant (i.e., his presence during the 
purchase of the car and his subsequent use of the car), to refute 
the element of concealment. In a footnote, the court in Sanders 
also pointed out that the legislative history of the federal 
statute demonstrated that the "'language of the statute is 
intended to include transactions designed to conceal the identity 
of the participants to the transactions, where it can also be 
proved that the funds involved in the transaction are in fact the 
proceeds of the crime.'" Id. at 946 n.3 (quoting Senate Report 
No. 99-433). 
In addition, the court quickly rejected the argument 
advanced by the government that the statute should be broadly 
interpreted to reach all transactions, however ordinary, which 
involve proceeds of unlawful activity. Id. at 946. The holding 
in Sanders was then reaffirmed by the Tenth Circuit in United 
States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1036 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 
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113 S.Ct. 169 (1992), where the court reversed a money laundering 
conviction because there was insufficient evidence of intent to 
conceal. The defendant had created the impression with a car 
salesman that defendant operated a lucrative siding business, and 
he even offered the salesman a job. 
The Fifth Circuit recently reached the same result in United 
States v. Dobbs, 63 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1995). In that case, the 
defendant's convictions for money laundering were reversed absent 
evidence that he had attempted to disguise the nature, location, 
source, ownership, or control of the proceeds which the defendant 
obtained by fraudulently disposing of loan collateral. In one 
instance, the defendant, a rancher in Texas, had deposited the 
illegal proceeds in his wife's bank account. The funds were then 
used to pay household and ranch expenses. In the second 
instance, the defendant converted the money into four cashiers 
checks which were again used to pay household and ranch expenses. 
Such transactions, the Dobbs court concluded, were as open and 
notorious as a typical bank transaction may be, and failed to 
show that the defendant had attempted to conceal the origin of 
the money or disguise his relationship to the transactions in 
order to launder the money. Id. at 397-98. See also Dimeck, 24 
F.3d at 1245 (it is necessary to show desire to create appearance 
of legitimate wealth or otherwise to conceal nature of funds so 
that it might enter the economy as legitimate funds); United 
States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 966 F.2d 918, 926 (5th Cir. 1992) 
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(overturning money laundering conviction because insufficient 
evidence of a design to conceal nature and source of drug 
proceeds). 
In United States v. Garcia-Emmanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 
1994), the Tenth Circuit again turned a critical eye to section 
1956. The focus in this case was whether the defendant knew that 
his transactions were designed , in whole or in part, to conceal 
or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control 
of the proceeds of his drug business. Importantly, the court 
stated that when a person engages in a transaction for present 
personal benefit, and not to create the appearance of legitimate 
wealth, this does not violate the federal money laundering 
statute. Id. at 1474. "While there are many things that 
criminals can do with their profits that would arouse suspicion 
of an intent to launder the money, actions that are merely 
suspicious and do not provide substantial evidence of a design to 
conceal will not alone support a conviction." Id. at 75; see 
also United States v. Rockelman, 49 F.3d 418, 422 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(money laundering conviction must be supported by evidence that 
defendant knew that the purchase of a cabin was intended to 
conceal or disguise the nature, ownership, source, or control of 
the proceeds of the drug dealing; court held no intent to conceal 
where transaction was open and conspicuous). 
In Garcia-Emmanuel, the defendant was convicted on seventeen 
counts of money laundering, conspiracy to possess cocaine with 
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intent to distribute, and continuing criminal enterprise. On 
defendant's motion, the trial court granted a judgment of 
acquittal on all the money laundering convictions, and both sides 
appealed. The appellate court concluded that the government 
failed to prove twelve of the counts, but the court reinstated 
the convictions for the remaining five. 14 F.3d at 1473. 
The court ruled that the following transactions did not 
constitute money laundering under the disguise or conceal prong 
of the statute: (1) the defendant made a mortgage payment with a 
cashier's check purchased with drug money, (2) the defendant made 
a payment for land where he, and not his restaurant, was named as 
remitter on the check, (3) the defendant and his wife purchased a 
horse with drug money, and misrepresented to the seller that the 
money came from weekend profits at the restaurant; the defendant 
accomplished the transaction for his own personal benefit, and 
not to conceal the circumstances in which the money was made, (4) 
the defendant made an additional payment on the horse just 
mentioned, (5) the defendant purchased horses, a horse trailer, a 
covered riding arena, and a round riding pen with cash or checks; 
the defendant's ownership was open and notorious, and the 
government provided no evidence of concealment, (6) the defendant 
purchased a watch with a cashier's check upon which he appears as 
remitter, and (7) the defendant wired money from his bank account 
to the Florida bank account of a Columbian national, and the 
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government provided no other evidence about any unusual features 
in the transaction. Id. at 1476-78. 
In addition, the court held that the defendant's purchase of 
another horse and trailer, which were placed in his wife's name, 
did demonstrate money laundering. The court wrote that 
"[o] rdinarily, this would not be sufficient to convict of money 
laundering." However, at trial the jury heard the testimony of a 
co-conspirator that the defendant put the property in his wife's 
name to deceive the IRS. The evidence was "probative of a design 
to conceal." Id. at 1478. 
Indeed, in this case the state offered uncontroverted 
evidence that Lloyd was the signatory on all but one of the 
accounts into which the proceeds were deposited. The individual 
investors no doubt received the cancelled checks that had been 
given to Lloyd and which Lloyd had deposited into the various 
accounts over which he had control. Each check would reflect the 
financial institution where the check was deposited as well as 
the date of deposit. Assuming that Lloyd had committed the 
offenses set forth in counts 1 through 24, there was no attempt 
whatsoever to conceal the fact that he controlled those accounts 
and that the money came from the investors. Again, if he did not 
disclose the fact to the investors that he controlled the 
accounts, then that might be further evidence of fraud, not money 
laundering. The state also closely focusses on transactions 
between the accounts controlled by Lloyd. However, the notion 
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that such transfers were accomplished in order to "conceal or 
disguise" the money makes no sense. Such transfers left an 
obvious paper trail, and in any event, it is the state's theory 
that the alleged victims were not even aware of the accounts. 
Because Lloyd was the signatory on the accounts, it is 
inconceivable that he was trying to conceal or disguise anything 
by shuffling funds back and forth between those accounts. If 
there is something suspicious about that activity, do not lead to 
a logical inference of an intent to conceal or disguise. 
Another important point is that there has been no attempt in 
this case to provide a full accounting of all of the transactions 
pertaining to the various bank accounts relevant to the money 
laundering charges, and this was of considerable concern to the 
magistrate. (R. at 1273) Verdi White did not follow the money 
all the way through from its point of origin to the final 
recipient. Following the money by obtaining a complete 
transactional record for each account would have been easy to do, 
and would have more clearly shown Lloyd's intent. 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the state has produced no 
evidence that Lloyd attempted to conceal or disguise the 
proceeds. Quite the opposite is true. The alleged victims could 
easily have discovered where the money was deposited and who 
controlled each account. This has nothing to do with incompetent 
money laundering as the state suggests (State's Brief at 46-47), 
but with the intent to conceal. Approaching the allegations in a 
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light most favorable to the state, the purported reason for 
setting up the bank accounts into which the checks were deposited 
was so that Lloyd could gain control of the money for his 
personal use. In other words, the transactions had nothing to do 
with concealment, but instead the transactions were allegedly 
designed to permit Lloyd to gain access to the money obtained 
from the fraud perpetrated on the victims. In other words, the 
bank accounts were set up to further the objectives of the 
fraudulent scheme. Indeed, in his affidavit in support of the 
original information, Verdi White said as much: the financial 
transactions accomplished by Lloyd were done "all for the purpose 
of continuing the unlawful activity of securities fraud." (R. at 
35) After the preliminary hearing, defense counsel observed that 
after the investors gave the checks to Lloyd, the money was 
deposited in the appropriate account bearing the name of the 
company: "every check shows that. Every deposit shows that. On 
the back of each check that was presented here, it shows that's 
where the money went. So it can't be that transaction that is 
used to disguise [or] conceal either the nature, the location, 
the source or the ownership or the control of the funds." (R. at 
1271-72) 
Likewise, the magistrate expressed serious concern about the 
evidence supporting the money laundering counts, and explained 
that 
37 
the evidence that was presented by the State regarding 
the sources of the money was very inadequate. I mean, 
there were a lot of unanswered questions here. . . . I 
was not very pleased with what was presented in terms 
of, you know, where the money came from, where it went 
to. There were a lot of unanswered questions in the 
whole transaction and trying to identify exactly what 
was happening. And to this day, I have a lot of 
questions in my mind. 
(R. at 1273) 
In short, based on the evidence that was offered the 
magistrate did not find probable cause to believe that there was 
an intent to conceal or disguise. The state also argues that 
Lloyd's intent is manifested by the evasive responses he gave to 
the investors when the investors later asked Lloyd about the 
location of the money. However, it is Lloyd's state of mind at 
the time of the transaction that matters. After all, money 
laundering is about making illegally obtained proceeds appear 
legitimate. Relevant to that inquiry are the circumstances 
directly surrounding the transaction, not statements that might 
have been made well after the transaction occurred. 
In sum, the state provided and inadequate and incomplete 
picture of any alleged money laundering by Lloyd, and failed to 
demonstrate the necessary intent to conceal or disguise. The 
state failed to meet its burden on counts 26-35, and the 
magistrate properly dismissed those counts. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and argument, Lloyd requests 
this Court to affirm the magistrate's dismissal of the 
racketeering count and the money laundering counts. 
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